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Abstract
This study illustrates how information from micro-level and survey-based databases can be 
used, along with macroeconomic indicators, to provide a better understanding of corporate 
investment obstacles across the EU. To show this, we use a novel dataset merging firm-
level data from the European Investment Bank Investment Survey (EIBIS) and hard data from 
corporations’ balance sheet and P&L information. We show that the indicators of impediments 
to investment at the country level, which can be derived from aggregating qualitative answers, 
correlate relatively well with macro-based hard data, which are commonly considered as 
determinants of investments in macro-based models. After controlling for firm-specific 
characteristics, the perceived investment gap (the difference between desired and actual 
investment) remains correlated with the reported impediments. While access to finance is 
not the most reported obstacle, reporting it has the highest information content. Moreover, 
the signal intensifies when it is given by “weaker” firms, defined as those that are smaller, 
and/or more indebted, and/or less profitable and/or with lower liquidity positions. From a 
policy standpoint, our findings suggest that survey-based information can be a useful input to 
complement both macro and micro hard data and better inform the design of targeted policies 
to support investment.
Keywords: investment obstacles, investment gap, corporate investment, investment determinants, 
survey-based information, access to finance.
JEL classification: D22, D25, G30, G38.
Resumen 
Este documento muestra cómo se puede utilizar la información obtenida de bases de datos 
a nivel individual y de encuestas, junto con indicadores macroeconómicos, para mejorar la 
comprensión de los obstáculos a la inversión a los que las empresas de la UE se enfrentan. 
Para ello, utilizamos un conjunto de datos novedoso que combina datos a escala de empresa, 
provenientes de la Encuesta sobre Inversión y Financiación de la Inversión del Banco Europeo 
de Inversiones (EIBIS, por sus siglas en inglés), con la información de balance y de pérdidas 
y ganancias de las empresas. Mostramos que los indicadores de impedimentos a la inversión 
a nivel país, que se derivan de la agregación de respuestas cualitativas, se correlacionan 
relativamente bien con los datos macroeconómicos comúnmente considerados como 
determinantes de la inversión en muchos modelos. Después de controlar por características 
específicas a escala de empresa, la brecha de inversión percibida (la diferencia entre la inversión 
deseada y la real) permanece correlacionada con las barreras declaradas. Aunque el acceso a 
la financiación no es el obstáculo más reportado, es el que provee mayor información. La señal 
de este impedimento se intensifica cuando es proporcionada por empresas «más débiles», 
que se definen como aquellas que son más pequeñas, y/o más endeudadas, y/o menos 
rentables y/o con una menor liquidez. Desde el punto de vista de políticas públicas, nuestros 
hallazgos sugieren que la información basada en encuestas supone un aporte útil para 
complementar otras fuentes cuantitativas, tanto individuales como agregadas, proporcionado 
una información muy útil para el diseño de mejores políticas específicas encaminadas a 
apoyar la inversión.
Palabras clave: obstáculos a la inversión, brecha de inversión, inversión empresarial, 
determinantes de la inversión, información basada en encuestas, acceso a la financiación.
Códigos JEL: D22, D25, G30, G38.
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1 Introduction
Investment is a key factor for sustaining long-run economic growth and a major contributor to 
business cycle fluctuations. The collapse of corporate investment in 2008 and its relatively weak 
recovery in the aftermath of the crisis has renewed interest among academics and policy-makers to 
improve understanding of the drivers and obstacles to investment. After years of underinvestment 
(with this variable far below its long-term trend), with potentially long-lasting negative consequences 
for potential growth and firms’ productivity, it has become crucial to have a clearer picture of the 
obstacles that corporations face in their investment decisions. In this paper, we use a recent survey 
conducted by the European Investment Bank (EIB). Based on granular data matching both hard 
and survey data at the level of each firm, we illustrate how barriers to investment actually correlate 
with investment needs and how they result in perceived investment gaps, i.e. the difference 
between desired investment and that actually undertaken by the corporation.
Investment drivers and obstacles have been widely discussed in the literature, both 
from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. At its core, the decision to invest is a profit-
maximization problem where the optimal capital stock is determined by factors both internal 
and external to the firm. Traditional neoclassical models emphasize the role played by growth 
opportunities and the user cost of capital in shaping investment decisions (Jorgenson, 1971), 
channels which have been widely backed by empirical evidence (Bond and Van Reenen, 2003). 
Furthermore, numerous studies have corroborated that financial constraints have a significant 
negative effect on investment beyond the cost of raising external finance (Fazzari et al., 1988; 
Hennessy et al., 2007). In addition to financial frictions, whenever investment decisions suffer 
some degree of irreversibility, policy and economic uncertainty are shown to delay investment 
projects (Abel and Eberly, 1994). This is the so-called “wait-and-see” effect of uncertainty, 
which can affect both the timing and level of investment. Finally, another branch of the literature 
highlights that regulation, taxation and the efficacy of the judicial system also affect investment 
decisions (Alesina et al., 2005; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).
Determining the relative importance of these factors in explaining investment decisions 
is a difficult task, and especially so using macroeconomic indicators, as the impact is likely to 
depend on companies´ characteristics. Moreover, it is challenging to gather both information 
about a wide range of different investment obstacles and detailed information regarding 
investment decisions. Hence, some have studied barriers to investment using survey data 
(Beck et al., 2005; Ferrando and Mulier, 2015; European Commission, 2017).
In this paper, we exploit the European Investment Bank Investment Survey (EIBIS) to 
shed light on this issue. The EIBIS provides a way to illustrate each of these channels, as firms 
report impediments to investment resulting from lack of demand, uncertainty, finance, regulation 
(both business and labor) and others. The EIBIS is a granular dataset collecting information 
on around 12,500 non-financial corporations.1 The survey has been conducted over two years, 
1 In the rest of the paper, firms, companies, enterprises or corporates always refer to non-financial corporations.
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2016 and 2017.2 Besides being granular, representative and enabling micro-analysis, the survey 
offers qualitative information not available in hard data and it is unique in terms of the wide 
coverage of obstacles considered. Our analysis exploits information about impediments to 
investment and the perceived investment gap.
We match firm-level data from EIBIS with balance sheet and profit and loss (P&L) 
information as collected by ORBIS. We then link firms’ investment gap with firms’ impediments 
to investment, while controlling for firms’ characteristics. This allows us to investigate the relative 
role of obstacles in explaining the perceived investment gap while controlling at the same time 
for firm-specific characteristics such as size, age, sector and financial position. We provide novel 
evidence on the relative importance that different obstacles may have in explaining the investment 
gap that firms report experiencing in their recent activity.
The main findings of the paper are threefold. First, we show that survey-based 
measures of impediments provide a reliable source of the channels explaining investment 
as they correlate rather well with macro-based hard data compiled at the country level. 
Hence, signals for corporate investment can be extracted from the survey, especially for 
cross-country comparisons. Second, we show that “weaker” firms, defined as smaller, and/
or more indebted, and/or less profitable and/or with lower liquidity positions, tend to report 
more impediments. Whether this reflects the endogeneity of the firm to its environment or 
some bias in the perceptions is left to further research. Third, we show that, controlling for 
the firms’ characteristics, reporting an impediment provides a signal for investment. Firms 
reporting impediments are more likely to report an investment gap, with a stronger magnitude 
when the impediment is reported as major. The signal intensifies when it is given by firms that 
are smaller, and/or less profitable and/or more indebted. As we do not find such dependency 
on the region, our results do not support the notion that corporations located in the periphery 
continue to be discriminated for systemic reasons years after the end of the crisis.
The rest of the paper comprises four sections, concluding remarks and two annexes. 
In the second section, we provide an overview of the barriers to investment as reported in the 
EIBIS. In the third section, we elaborate on the literature on investment determinants and show 
that five of them are explicitly covered in the survey, namely: growth opportunities, financial 
frictions, uncertainty, and business and labor market regulation. We show that their survey-based 
measures correlate relatively well with macro-based measures traditionally used to gauge them. 
In the fourth section, we show that factors internal to the firm are also related to the perception 
of barriers to investment. In the fifth section, we evaluate the relative role of these obstacles in 
explaining the investment gap that firms perceive in their activity. Then, we focus on possible 
asymmetric impacts across types of firms or regions. Annex I describes the EIBIS survey and 
Annex II presents the matching with the ORBIS database.
2  A third wave was under development at the time of preparing this paper. See Annex I for a detailed description of 
the survey.
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2 Long-term impediments to investment: evidence from the EIBIS 
To better understand the barriers that a firm might face in its investment activities, the 
EIBIS asks European corporations about nine potential obstacles, whether each is a major, 
minor or no impediment at all to investment.3 The question provides the view of the firms regarding the 
factors limiting their investment activity over an undefined time horizon and their intensity. 
The possible limiting factors reflect some classical determinants of the level of investment, such 
as demand, uncertainty (Abel and Eberly, 1994), access to finance (Fazzari et al., 1988; Hennessy 
et al., 2007) and business regulation (Alesina et al., 2005; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). But 
there are other impediments that are covered with less frequency in the literature, such as energy 
costs and access to digital infrastructure. Given that they do not refer to a specific time period, the 
questions offer a broad view of the long-term impediments to investment for European companies.4
Chart 1.1 shows the percentage of European Union firms that perceive each of the long-
term obstacles to investment, alongside the relative importance attributed to them. As in the rest 
of the paper, this figure takes into account the companies’ responses to the first two waves of 
the survey available until now (2016 and 2017).
Combining obstacles that are reported as minor or major, Chart 1.1 shows that 
uncertainty about the future is clearly the most important limiting impediment, being 
mentioned by close to 80% of the companies. Then, in descending order, are the availability 
of staff with the right skills, business regulation (e.g. licenses, permits, bankruptcy), and labor 
regulation; each of those is reported by more than 60% of the European firms. Energy costs 
and lack of demand for products and services appear in fifth and sixth position, respectively. 
They are followed by the availability of finance, which relates to both internal and external 
3 See question 38 of the general module questionnaire.
4  Firms’ responses will, nonetheless, vary from wave to wave depending on their perceptions in each moment, as well as 
on the business cycle position of the economy. Besides, part of the population surveyed change across waves.
SOURCES: EIBIS-16 and EIBIS-17.
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financing. Lastly, the factors mentioned by a smaller number of corporations are availability of 
adequate transport infrastructure and access to digital infrastructure.
If we focus only on the share of companies that mention each obstacle as being a major 
one to investment, the order in relevance remains very similar to the previous one, but with three 
exceptions: the availability of staff with the right skills becomes the obstacle reported by the 
highest number of firms, the availability of finance becomes the fifth most important factor and 
lack of demand takes the sixth spot.
Over time, the results change marginally in the two waves. However, in the latest wave, 
the share of corporations reporting most of the obstacles is slightly lower. Given the improvement 
in the general economic situation recorded over the two waves, this could indicate that firms’ 
perceptions are somewhat influenced by the business cycle.
Given that some factors, such as demand, availability of staff and uncertainty, are 
substantially tied to the position in the business cycle, we therefore analyze the answer across 
countries. For the sake of simplicity, the 28 EU economies are grouped into three sets: Cohesion, 
comprising the countries that joined the EU after the enlargement in 2004 and later; Periphery, 
which is made up by the countries that have experienced a downgrade of, at least, two notches 
in their rating during the sovereign debt crisis; and Other economies.5 Over the recent past, these 
groups of economies have experienced different headwinds. Chart 1.2 shows the distribution of the 
sum of obstacles by region. In this figure, when a company reports an obstacle as being a major one 
to investment, it is given a weight of 1, whereas if the impediment is considered to be a minor 
one the weight assigned is 0.5. Hence, the sum of obstacles varies in the range of zero to nine.
Periphery is clearly tilted to the right compared to Other economies and the Cohesion 
region. This means that the countries that have been most hit by the economic crisis tend 
to report a higher number of obstacles (more firms report several impediments), even several 
years after the end of the sovereign debt crisis. In Periphery, the mode of the distribution is located 
between five and six obstacles, with this range reported by about 16% of the corporations. 
Differently, for Other economies, the mode value is located between one and two barriers to 
investment. Cohesion countries are somewhere in the middle, with the higher proportion of 
companies reporting between three to five obstacles. Overall, half of the corporations report more 
than five obstacles in Periphery, compared with four in Cohesion and three in Other economies.
One would expect some degree of correlation among the impediments reported, as 
some obstacles may be linked by nature. For instance, business regulation tends to develop 
with labor regulation. Also, if a corporation perceives a lack of demand, then it is quite possible 
that the same firm will also report a high level of uncertainty about the future, given the link 
5  Cohesion countries include: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. Periphery countries include: Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
Other economies include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. In 2017, Cohesion, Periphery and Other economies accounted respectively for 8%, 
23% and 69% of EU GDP.
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between demand and uncertainty (Bloom, 2009). Besides, the company profi le will clearly 
affect the impediments observed: a fi rm that is labor-intensive is more likely to report lack of 
staff with the right skills and at the same time claim that labor market regulation is an obstacle 
to investment.
Table 1 reports the correlation matrix among the nine obstacles. It shows that correlation 
is always positive and, in general, relatively high. The relationship is the strongest between labor 
and business regulation (53%), given that both obstacles capture dimensions of the regulatory 
framework of a country and hence co-move. Conversely, correlation is weakest between 
uncertainty and availability of staff with the right skills (18%).
By defi nition, some factors seen as potential obstacles to investment are very specifi c, and 
presumably do not affect all fi rms. For instance, availability of transport and digital infrastructure, 
energy costs and staff with adequate skills are likely to matter differently across sectors: energy 
costs may be more of a source of concern for industrial corporations than in services. Adequate 
transport is less relevant in the services industry, apart from the transportation sub-sector, while 
digital infrastructure will matter more, especially compared to the construction sector. According 
to Table 1, transport, digital and energy obstacles are quite intercorrelated: correlation between 
transport and digital infrastructure amount to 41% and correlation between energy costs and 
digital infrastructure to 40%. These high correlations may refl ect the level of development of 
the country or the social choices towards public goods, as more developed economies tend 
to have better infrastructure. Staff with the right skills is the impediment that shows the lowest 
relationship to any other.
Alleviating investment impediments arising from skills, energy, transport and digital 
infrastructure requires specifi c or sectorial policies and targeted interventions, as they do not 
refl ect the macroeconomic environment and are likely to be perceived asymmetrically among 
SOURCES: EIBIS-16 and EIBIS-17.
a EU-wide results.
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corporations. Conversely, access to financing, lack of demand, the level of uncertainty and the 
regulatory framework (both for business and labor) are economy-wide and are likely to affect all 
the corporations, albeit to a different extent. In the rest of this study, we focus on these five 
obstacles, as they can be addressed with the macroeconomic or competition policy toolkit. 
Chart 2 breaks down the EU sample among the three regions already considered to show the 
proportion of firms reporting each obstacle, one by one.
The conclusions obtained for each obstacle separately are similar to those reached for the 
sum of obstacles: each impediment, irrespective of its nature, is reported by a higher proportion 
of firms in Periphery than in Cohesion. In all cases, the proportion is above that recorded in Other 
economies. Interestingly, the ranking of impediments is similar across regions and over the two 
waves: uncertainty is the most reported impediment, with a noticeable difference also between 
Periphery, where it is reported by around 75% of corporations, and less in Other economies, 
where it is reported by less than 50% of firms. Business and labor regulations are next, in a very 
narrow range. They are reported in each region and each year with a very similar proportion. Then 
follows demand. Availability of finance is the least reported, but with a wide gap between Other 
economies (around 27% on average) and Periphery (about 52% on average).
For most impediments and each region, the proportion decreases from 2016 to 2017. 
The improvement is relatively modest overall, but somewhat stronger for the availability of finance 
and demand, especially in Periphery. Indeed, differences across time are much less pronounced 
than differences across regions.
We have drawn some stylized facts regarding the impediments to investment over time 
and across regions. Now, we illustrate how each of the five impediments is tied to an investment 
channel, traditionally captured through macroeconomic indicators. We show that, across 
countries, the survey-based indicator correlates rather well with the macroeconomic indicators 
traditionally used.
SOURCES: EIBIS-16 and EIBIS-17.
a The weighted proportion of firms reporting each obstacle is constructed as follows: if an obstacle is reported as a major it is given a weight of 1, whereas if it is 
reported as a minor, its weight is 0.5.
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3 Illustrating the main investment channels 
The use of granular data to provide information on impediments to investment is an interesting 
feature of the EIBIS, especially since these can be associated with firms’ characteristics at 
the individual level. Each of the impediments considered in the paper illustrates a channel 
developed in the literature on investment, the intensity of which can be then estimated at the 
granular level assuming that the survey-based measures reflects the macroeconomic counterpart. 
In turn, macroeconomic proxies have been constructed to provide information on the intensity of 
the channel. Taking each impediment one after the other, we show what the channel illustrates 
and how it compares with its macroeconomic counterpart. For each impediment, we correlate a 
measure obtained by aggregating across corporations of each country, with an objective economy-
wide measure. We thereby show that the questions related to impediments provide a granular 
counterpart to more traditional measures based on hard data. This supports the use of the survey 
answers as an alternative measure upon which cross-sectional analysis can be conducted.
3.1 Economic activity and growth opportunities 
The role of economic activity and growth opportunities in determining investment has been 
corroborated by numerous theoretical and empirical studies.6 In a standard neoclassical model 
with perfectly competitive markets and no informational frictions, investment will only be a function 
of Tobin’s q,7 adjusted for the relative prices of investment goods and tax rates. In turn, Tobin’s 
q highlights the role played by growth opportunities and the user cost of capital.8 The Keynesian 
approach to investment puts more emphasis on the role of demand expectations and the way 
agents form these expectations. Investment decisions are driven by firms’ expectations about 
future profitability (Keynes, 1936). Tobin’s q has been extensively used to predict investment 
spending and to control for firms’ current and future profitability in empirical studies of corporate 
behavior (Tobin, 1969; Hayashi, 1982; Erickson and Whited, 2000).
Chart 3 shows that, across countries, the share of firms reporting the lack of demand as 
an obstacle (either major or minor) to investment correlates negatively quite well (reaching -35%) with 
the average output gap recorded in the years prior to the survey (period 2013-2016). A smaller 
output gap, which reflects less slack and stronger demand in the economy, is accompanied by a 
smaller proportion of corporations reporting demand as an impediment to their investment plans. 
Chart 3 also shows that there are important differences across groups of countries. Countries in 
Periphery, Cohesion and Other economies are plotted in light red, yellow and blue, respectively.9 
Most of the countries included in Periphery are located in the upper left-hand part of the chart, 
which means that they tend to have a more negative output gap as well as more firms perceiving 
a lack of demand. Conversely, countries from the Other region are located in the lower right-hand 
part of the figure.
6 See Oliner et al. (1995) for an empirical survey of the literature.
7  Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio between the market value of a firm and the replacement cost of its assets. This statistic 
depends on the firm’s profitability and the financial market’s required rate of return.
8 See Caballero (1999) for an excellent survey of the theoretical literature.
9 The same signalling colors are used in the Charts: 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9.
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3.2 Uncertainty
Another branch of the literature highlights the role of uncertainty as an additional relevant 
determinant of investment. Uncertainty may affect investment through different channels. 
According to the real option theory, as long as investment projects are (even partially) irreversible, 
uncertainty shocks may increase fi rms’ incentives to delay investment until some of the uncertainty 
resolves. This generates the so-called “wait-and-see” effect, which affects both the timing and the 
level of investment.10 On the other hand, some authors highlight the role of fi nancial distortions as 
the most relevant mechanism through which uncertainty materializes. Arguably, periods of higher 
uncertainty may exacerbate the consequences of fi nancial frictions and credit tightness.11
An empirical validation of the adverse effects of uncertainty appears challenging, as there 
is no consensual measure of uncertainty. Different authors propose different ways to measure 
uncertainty with the aim of studying the impact of aggregate uncertainty on macroeconomic 
dynamics.12 Only a few studies consider the impact of uncertainty on investment using fi rm-level 
data. Julio and Yook (2012) fi nd a negative effect of political uncertainty on corporate investment 
for a large panel of countries considering election dates as a source of exogenous variation of 
uncertainty. Using the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index developed by Baker et al. (2016), 
Gulen and Ion (2016) assess the impact of policy uncertainty on US corporate investment. 
They fi nd a negative average effect which is further amplifi ed for fi rms undertaking investment 
projects which are more irreversible, as one would expect according to the “wait-and-see” 
effect. In a similar vein, the work of Dejuán and Guirelli (2018) investigates the role of policy 
aggregate uncertainty on investment for the case of Spain using fi rm-level data. The authors 
fi nd evidence that policy uncertainty reduces the corporate investment rate. In addition, they 
show that fi rms with in a worse fi nancial situation are more affected by uncertainty. Their results 
are consistent with the fi nancial friction channel developed below.
10 See, among others, Bernanke (1983), Pindyck (1991), Bertola and Caballero (1994) and Abel and Eberly (1994).
11 See Gilchrist et al. (2014), Christiano et al. (2014) and Arellano et al. (2016).
12 See Bloom (2009), Bachmann et al. (2013), Jurado et al. (2015), Basu and Bundick (2017).
SOURCES: EIBIS-16, EIBIS-17 and IMF.
a Output gap calculated as actual GDP minus potential GDP, reported as a percentage of potencial GDP.
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As a measure of uncertainty, we use the forecast error on GDP in 2016 and 2017, 
based on the European Commission economic projections released in autumn of the preceding 
year. For each year, we take the absolute difference between forecasts made in autumn of the 
previous year and the actual GDP growth rate. The results are shown in Chart 4. There is indeed 
a positive correlation between the macroeconomic measure of uncertainty and the survey-based 
measure, amounting to 23%. Across countries, the higher the share of firms reporting uncertainty 
as an impediment, the lower the ability to forecast. The positive correlation gives credit to the 
survey-based measure of uncertainty.
3.3 Financial frictions
Modigliani-Miller’s theorem (1958) established the basis of modern thinking about the capital 
structure of a firm. The theorem states that in an efficient market, and in the absence of taxes, 
bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and asymmetric information, the value of a firm is unaffected 
by how that firm is financed, so that its liability structure is irrelevant. Since then, scholars have 
recognized that frictions in capital markets make the financing structure an important determinant 
of corporate investment. Firms make investment decisions subject not only to expected profit 
determinants (demand and prices) but also to a full range of choices regarding their capital 
structure (internal funds, debt and equity financing), where external funds are costly owing to 
agency problems in financial markets. Indeed, the conditions through which they access external 
funds matter for their investment decisions.
Empirical evidence suggests a significant role of financial frictions in explaining 
investment dynamics. At the macroeconomic level, different methodologies have been 
proposed to estimate financial conditions and provide a structural identification to analyze the 
drivers behind their variations (Gilchrist et al., 2014, Darracq-Parriès et al., 2014, Maurin et al. 
2018).  At the microeconomic level, the seminal work of Fazzari et al. (1988) provides evidence 
that financial constraints have a significant effect on investment through the cost of raising 
external finance. Since then, a large body of the literature has been looking at the sensitivity 
SOURCES: EIBIS-16, EIBIS-17 and European Commission.
a The GDP forecasted error based on European Commission forecasts. See the main text for more details.
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of investment to firms’ internal funds while controlling for investment opportunities as proxied by 
Tobin’s q.13 In spite of the widely accepted motivation of these studies, disentangling causality 
remains controversial and unresolved. Furthermore, the work of Kaplan and Zingales (2000) 
opened a debate on whether the sensitivity of investment to cash flows is a reliable measure of 
the severity of financing constraints. Cash flows may appear to be associated with investment 
because of measurement errors in average Tobin’s q, which is an imperfect proxy of marginal q.
Other papers rely on survey data to assess the effect of financial constraints on real 
variables.14 The key advantage here is that, even if financial frictions are not observable, questions 
to firms about their problems when accessing credit provide a way to construct direct measures 
of financial constraints.
We compile a finance constraint indicator based on the EIBIS. A firm is financially 
constrained if any of the following situations occur: its loan applications have been rejected; it 
has only been granted a portion of the funds requested; the loan was extended but at a cost 
that it considers to be too high; and the company did not apply for external financing because 
it thought it would be turned down. The indicator, constructed for each firm, can be aggregated 
to provide a proportion of financially constrained firms. This gives an objective measure of the 
degree of finance constraints at the country level.
In Chart 5, we correlate this measure, by country, with the share of firms reporting 
finance as a long-term impediment to investment, a more subjective measure. The two indicators 
correlate positively, with a correlation amounting to 34%. Therefore, the less financially constrained 
a company is, the less likely it is to report availability of finance as an obstacle. By region, as 
expected, Other economies are concentrated in a low percentage of financially constrained firms 
13  In a similar vein, other authors study whether firms’ specific characteristics that determine creditworthiness and access 
to finance, namely the firm’s balance sheet structure, debt burden and profitability ratio, will affect investment decisions 
through the credit channel. See, among others, the work of Bond and Meguir (1994), Estrada and Vallés (1998), 
Hennessy et al. (2007) and Herranz and Martínez-Carrascal (2017).
14 See Beck et al. (2005), Campello et al. (2010), Ferrando and Mulier (2015), Coluzzi et al. (2009), García-Posada (2018).
SOURCES: EIBIS-16, EIBIS-17 and IMF.
a The proportion of financially constrained firms is derived from the EIBIS survey. See the main text for a detailed explanation on how this indicator is built.
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and low levels of corporations claiming finance as an impediment, while the rest of the countries 
are distributed along this relationship.
3.4 Regulation, taxation and judicial system efficiency
Regulation, taxation and judicial system efficacy may also affect investment decisions. Policy-
makers highlight that structural policies aimed at improving the regulatory environment, reducing 
barriers of entry for firms and increasing the overall flexibility of labor and product markets are 
investment-enhancing measures (ECB, 2016).
The regulatory environment may affect investment decisions in different ways. First, it 
may have a direct effect on capital adjustment costs. As suggested by Alesina et al. (2005), red 
tape costs and other administrative impediments imply costs of doing business. Their stylized 
theoretical framework provides an underpinning for a positive effect of a decrease in the 
cost of firms to adjust their capacity on investment. Second, barriers to entry will affect 
the number of firms in a given market, which may in turn impact the optimal capital stock 
and consequent investment flows. Using an indicator of entry barriers which comprises 
legal restrictions and vertical integration, Alesina et al. (2005) estimate a dynamic model 
of investment. Their findings suggest a negative relationship between barriers to entry 
and investment. In addition to this, Beck et al. (2005) analyze the impact of financial, legal and 
corruption obstacles on firms’ growth using a cross-sectional survey conducted by the World 
Bank.15 They find a negative correlation between the obstacles considered and firms’ growth. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect is found to be higher for smaller firms.
Finally, investment is sensitive to the quality of the institutional framework, which 
comprises both regulations and enforcement institutions. More specifically, investment contracts 
may be subject to default risks due to hold-up problems arising from the potential irreversibility 
and specificity of investment decisions. Therefore, a stable framework of relationships between 
companies needs mechanisms that guarantee the enforcement of contracts, such as the judicial 
system. The seminal paper of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) evaluates the importance of “property 
rights institutions” and “contracting institutions” in affecting economic growth, investment and 
financial development. Their findings point to an important role of different proxies of property 
rights institutions and contracting institutions on the investment-to-GDP ratio for a large panel of 
developed and developing countries. In addition, García-Posada and Mora-Sanguinetti (2014) 
focus on the role of the design and efficacy of enforcement institutions (judicial system) on firms’ 
entry and exit rates. They find that higher judicial efficacy increases firms’ entry rate, whereas no 
effect seems to be present for the case of the exit rate. Overall, the existing evidence seems to 
suggest that a well-functioning judicial system is essential to create the appropriate environment 
for investment decisions to be made.
Chart 6 shows the relationship between measures of the intensity of the regulatory 
framework elaborated by the OECD and the share of firms in each country that report regulation 
15 World Business Environment Survey.
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as an impediment. On the one hand, in Chart 6.1, business regulation is correlated with the 
Product Market Regulation Index. The latter is a comprehensive and internationally comparable 
indicator that measures the degree to which policies promote or inhibit competition in areas of 
the product market. On the other hand, in Chart 6.2, labor market regulation from the survey is 
correlated with the Strictness of Employment Protection Index, which measures the procedures 
and costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups of workers and the procedures involved in 
hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts.
In both figures, the correlation is positive, as the trend line is upward-sloping. It is 
somewhat steeper and more intense (R-squared 22%) in the case of the business obstacle 
than in that of the labor market (R-squared 11%). Therefore, as firms pursue their activities in an 
environment where the regulatory pressure is high, then they are more likely to feel that regulation 
(either relating to the labor market or to businesses in general) is an obstacle to their investment. 
Both figures also illustrate that, in the case of regulation, there are no clear differences by groups 
of countries, as occurred in the obstacles of demand and finance.
SOURCES: EIBIS-16, EIBIS-17 and OECD.
a A higher value of the index indicates a more stringent product market regulation.
b A higher value of the index indicates a stronger employment proctection.
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4 Characterizing the firms that report obstacles to investment 
In the previous section, we have provided evidence that the survey answers received from 
corporations are indeed linked to a more objective measure of what the question intends to 
reflect. At the aggregated level, across countries, this association between hard data, based on 
measurements, and soft data, based on survey answers, suggests that the latter also provide an 
objective signal. We now turn to the subjective part of the individual answers. We show that, to 
some extent, firms’ perceptions reflect or are also influenced by their own characteristics.
In the first step, we estimate a cross-sectional regression, equation (1). We project the 
sum of the obstacles reported by each firm onto a set of characteristics. Each firm can report 
between 0 and 5 obstacles. The two vintages of the EIBIS are stacked so that firms and years 
are compacted. They are treated as one observation i, reflecting both a firm and a reporting year.
∑ impedimenti = αc + αt + β1profi + β2 indebti + β3 liquidi + β4sizei + sector and age dummies + ε
 
i       (1)
where αc and αt denote country and time dummies; prof refers to profitability ratio, 
measured as profits before interest and taxes relative to total assets; indebt is the indebtedness 
ratio, measured as interest-bearing debt relative to total assets; liquid is the liquidity ratio, 
measured as cash equivalents relative to total assets; and size is defined as the log of total 
assets. The equation also incorporates sector and age dummies. Age is a binary variable that 
takes the value of one if the firm has been operating for less than ten years and zero otherwise.
The distribution of the variables derived from the balance sheet or P&L is plotted in 
Annex II. Substantial differences can be observed across regions: over the period, based on 
the EIBIS-ORBIS matched sample, firms in Cohesion countries are smaller and tend to be less 
leveraged. Reflecting the worse economic environment at that time, firms in Periphery tend to 
have a lower cash ratio and lower returns on assets. To tackle the difference across regions, 
equation (1) is estimated on EU corporations on the whole as well as distinguishing them by 
Periphery, Cohesion and Other economies separately. Table 2 presents the results.
In all the cases, larger firms report fewer obstacles, a relationship significant at 99% in 
the EU and Cohesion, at 95% in Periphery and at 90% in Other economies. Young firms tend 
to report more obstacles, but the difference is not significant at the 90% threshold. Age is likely to 
be correlated with size, which is measured as a continuous variable in the regression. Therefore, 
size may capture the effect better, thereby explaining why age does not appear significantly in 
the regressions. Corporations that are more profitable tend to report less impediments, as the 
sign of the coefficient on the profitability ratio is negative. The effect is significant at 99% for 
the EU as a whole and for Cohesion. Similarly, firms with a higher liquidity ratio tend to report 
fewer obstacles. The effect is significant at 99% in the EU, and 90% in Cohesion and in Other 
economies. Conversely, firms that are more indebted tend to report more obstacles. The effect 
is significant at above 95% everywhere except in Periphery. Across sectors, firms operating 
in the construction sector tend to report more obstacles. The effect is significant at 99% in the 
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EU and in Periphery, at 95% in Cohesion, and not significant in Other economies. The fact that 
some coefficients are not significant in some regions might reflect the relatively small sample size 
rather than a weak relationship, this happens particularly in the Periphery and, to a lesser extent, in 
Other economics. With more waves of EIBIS coming up each year, this issue should fade over time.
Overall, this simple exercise shows that “weaker” firms – defined as firms that are 
smaller, and/or more indebted, and/or less profitable and/or with lower liquidity positions – tend 
to report more obstacles. Also, all other things being equal, firms in the construction sector 
tend to report more impediments. The relationships may be interpreted in two different ways. 
First, they may show degree of endogeneity, as firms tend to be weaker where the economic 
environment is less favorable. In this sense, weaker firms are precisely the product of lower 
demand, more uncertainty and more difficulty in accessing finance, which is why they might 
tend to report more impediments. Second, the relationships could also reflect some bias in 
their assessment of the barriers they actually face.
To analyze further this possibility, we turn in a second step to estimating a probit 
regression for reporting each impediment separately. In equation (2), reporting an impediment 
type by firm i is explained by a probit model which includes the same dependent variables as in 
equation (1): profitability, indebtedness, liquidity, size and, sector and age dummies. As before, 
the model includes country and year fixed effects.
Table 3 reports the average marginal effect of each variable for each of the reported 
impediments. This corresponds to the change in the probability of reporting an obstacle associated 
with a unit increase in the explanatory variable when all the variables are at their mean values.
EU Periphery Cohesion Other
Profitability ratio t-1 -0.490*** -0.678 -0.586*** -0.211
Indebtedness ratio t-1 0.158*** 0.205 0.110*** 0.284**
Liquidity ratio t-1 -0.387*** -0.191 -0.293* -0.520*
*740.0-***860.0-**830.0-***350.0-)stessa fo gol( eziS
520.0900.0-140.0610.0)sraey 01<( mrif gnuoY
440.0**762.0***713.0***402.0rotces noitcurtsnoC
100.0-250.0850.0630.0rotces secivreS
300.0731.0-401.0-960.0-rotces erutcurtsarfnI
471,3024,3808,1204,8snoitavresbO
590.0480.0960.0871.0derauqs-R
TABLE 2LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL ON THE NUMBER OF OBSTACLES REPORTED BY A FIRM (a) (b)
SOURCES: EIBIS-16, EIBIS-17 and ORBIS.
a The coefficients are obtained from a linear regression model with country and year fixed effects.
b The standard errors are corrected and clustered at country level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at confidence levels of 90%, 95% and 99%, respectively.
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The results are broadly consistent with the conclusions found for the sum of the 
impediments at the EU level. Higher profitability or liquidity ratios and a lower indebtedness ratio 
tend to reduce the probability of a corporation reporting an obstacle to investment irrespective of 
its nature. However, the magnitude of the effect varies across types of impediment and it is not 
always significant even at 90%. In several cases, the differences appear relatively intuitive when 
looking at the nature of the explanatory variable and the associated type of impediment.
For instance, in absolute terms, the impact of the profitability ratio on the probability 
of reporting an impediment is higher (and significant at the 99%) for uncertainty, demand and 
availability of finance for which the sensitivity is highest. Those are impediments of a more 
cyclical nature, such as the profitability indicator. Given their similar nature, it is therefore not 
surprising that they tend to share a more intense relationship. Conversely, the probability of 
reporting regulation as an impediment is not significantly affected by the profitability ratio. While in 
specific cases, at the sectoral level and after the change is implemented, a change in regulation 
is associated with a variation in the profitability ratio, in general and over time, variations in the 
profitability ratio scarcely reflect regulatory changes.
A stronger liquidity ratio also reduces the likelihood of reporting an impediment, especially 
for the availability of finance and, to a lesser extent for regulation (both business and labor) and 
uncertainty. In fact, liquidity or cash position are likely to act as buffers in uncertain times, so 
this reduces the likelihood of perceiving uncertainty as an impediment. The relatively stronger 
relationship between labor regulation and the liquidity ratio also appears relatively intuitive. Labor 
regulation tends to prevent the capacity for corporations to adjust labor demand in the face of 
an adverse shock in activity. Hence, stronger labor market regulation raises the need to hoard 
liquidity buffers to cover for the wage bill in the event of a temporary slowdown. This channel may 
explain why, other things being equal, a lower liquidity ratio increases the likelihood of reporting 
Uncertainty Demand Business reg. Labor reg. Availab. Finance
Profitability ratio t-1 -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.041 -0.054 -0.225***
Indebtedness ratio t-1 0.010 -0.019 0.019 0.002 0.206***
Liquidity ratio t-1 -0.065* -0.042 -0.084* -0.081* -0.224***
Size (log of assets) -0.004 0.004 -0.005 -0.013*** -0.019***
Young firm (<10 years) -0.020 -0.025 0.013 0.013 0.022
Construction sector 0.025 0.018 0.076*** 0.030** 0.066***
Services sector -0.009 -0.002 0.056*** 0.013 -0.001
Infrastructure sector -0.028* -0.057*** 0.016 -0.033* -0.005
282,8532,8852,8681,8012,8snoitavresbO
Pseudo R-squared 0.065 0.039 0.060 0.053 0.081
TABLE 3PROBIT REGRESSION MODEL OF THE PROBABILITY OF REPORTING A GIVEN OBSTACLE (a) (b)
Average marginal effect in percentage points (pp)
SOURCES: EIBIS-16, EIBIS-17 and ORBIS.
a The coefficients are obtained from a probit regression model with country and year fixed effects.
b The standard errors are corrected and clustered at country level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at confidence levels of 90%, 95% and 99%, respectively.
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labor regulation as an obstacle more than that of uncertainty and demand. Besides, a higher 
cash position reassures the lender, as it is associated with reduced liquidity risk. Hence, finance 
is less of a problem for firms with higher liquidity ratios.
Finally, the indebtedness ratio appears to have a significant impact at more than 90% 
only on the availability of finance, in fact at the 99%. Indeed, a firm’s indebtedness is one of the 
first signals looked at by the lender when a loan is requested in order to assess the company’s 
solvency and, therefore, its credit risk. A higher indebtedness ratio reduces the remaining amount 
of unencumbered assets that the lender can request as collateral, while it increases the risk of 
non-payment by raising the interest rate burden.
For most of the impediments, ceteris paribus, larger corporations tend to report fewer 
obstacles. The effect is significant for labor regulation, which large corporations can tackle more 
easily, and availability of finance, as larger companies can have access to intra-group funding. 
Finally, looking at sectors, uncertainty, labor regulation and demand tend to be less reported as 
an impediment by the infrastructure sector. All other things being equal, firms in the construction 
sector tend to report more often impediments from the regulatory (business and labor alike) side. 
They also tend to report more barriers from the financial side. This probably reflects some legacy 
stigmas of the most recent economic crisis, resulting partly from a construction boom in some 
countries. Finally, firms in the services industry tend to report more often business regulation as 
a barrier.
The results developed in this section show that “weaker” firms – defined as firms that 
are smaller, and/or more indebted, and/or less profitable and/or with lower liquidity positions – 
tend to report more impediments and to report each obstacle more often. At the same time, 
differences in the frequency of reporting an impediment can be rationalized by the nature of the 
impediment and what the related variable measures. The role of profitability is higher for reporting 
finance, uncertainty or demand as impediments. Liquidity matters most for the perception of 
uncertainty and availability of finance, whereas regulation is a more prevalent impediment for 
firms in the construction sector.
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5 Do reported investment barriers explain investment gaps?
5.1 Interpreting the reported investment gap 
The EIBIS poses a question related to the investment gap perceived by the firms in the three 
years prior to the survey. Corporations are asked if their level of investment over that period was 
enough to ensure the success of the company going forward (question 24 of the general module 
questionnaire) To this question, the firms can answer “too much”, “about the right amount”, “too 
little” or “don’t know/refused to answer”. In the following exercise, we exclude the firms that 
refused to answer, score the firms reporting having invested too little with a one and all the others 
(those which report having invested the right amount or too much and those which don’t know) 
with a zero. Summing up the answers, we can obtain the proportion of firms reporting an 
investment gap. In the analysis, we make this proportion conditional upon firms’ characteristics.
In Chart 7.1, the proportion of firms reporting having invested too little is shown for the 
entire EU and the two years spanning 2016 and 2017. The sample of corporations is broken 
down and the proportion is conditional upon the sector of activity, size and age of the firm.
Over the two years, there is a very moderate decline in the proportion of firms reporting 
an investment gap, having invested less than what they think they should have done, from 
16% in 2016 to 15% in 2017. Looking across sectors, a higher proportion of firms report an 
investment gap in the manufacturing sector and a lower proportion in the infrastructure sector. 
With the proportion ranging from 18% to 13%, the differences remain relatively minor in absolute 
terms, but not in relative terms. From 2016 to 2017, the biggest improvement is recorded in the 
construction sector, where the share of firms reporting a gap declined from 16% to 14%. Looking 
across size, starting with the same proportion in 2016 (16%), SMEs tend to report a lower 
investment gap than large corporations in 2017, a 2 pp difference. Finally, “older” firms, those 
that have been operating for more than 10 years, consistently report a higher investment gap.
SOURCES: EIBIS-16 and EIBIS-17.
a These figures are based on question 24 of the survey.
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Chart 7.2 reports the breakdown across regions, for the three country groups. It can be 
seen that the investment gap is largest in Cohesion, reaching 21% in 2017, above the EU average 
of 15%. Moreover, in this region, the gap widens from 2016 to 2017, albeit marginally, by just 
1 pp. Conversely, in Periphery, the gap narrows in 2017 and also in Other economies, but slightly. 
To conclude, along with the recovery in the EU, the gap is reported to have narrowed marginally, 
affecting 15% of firms in 2017. There are some differences at the aggregated level, but most 
of them appear relatively contained, with the exception of the investment gap in the Cohesion 
economies.
It is possible to correlate the country bottom-up perceived investment gap and 
macroeconomic aggregates of slack in the economy. We do so using on the one hand output 
gap estimates (Chart 8.1), and on the other hand real GDP growth (Chart 8.2). It appears that 
the reported investment gap correlates relatively well with both the output gap and GDP growth. The 
correlation amounts respectively to −28% and −17%. Weaker economic activity is associated 
with a higher investment gap and in a country facing a deeper recession (higher output gap), 
relatively more firms tend to report an investment gap.
Interpreting the investment gap can be somewhat difficult and misleading. The 
appearance of a gap can result from two very different mechanisms and understanding its 
nature is a pre-requisite to its normative interpretation. On the one hand, a widening can reflect 
an unexpected acceleration in activity. Ex-post, this results in a gap as the targeted level of 
investment was underestimated. In this case, the investment gap is positively correlated 
with a surprise in activity and does not reflect impediments/tensions. The targeted level of 
investment was simply not in line with the economic activity ex-post. As such, an investment 
gap reflects the sluggishness of expectations and the cautious attitude of corporates as 
much as positive unexpected shocks hitting the economy. On the other hand, an investment 
gap can reflect the impact of factors preventing investment. Firms are not able to reach 
SOURCES: EIBIS-16, EIBIS-17, IMF and Eurostat.
a Investment gap averaged across EIBIS-16 and EIBIS-17.
b Output gap as a percentage of GDP.
c Average yearly real GDP growth over the period 2008-2013.
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the level of investment targeted for various reasons reported as impediments. The EIBIS can 
contribute to dissociating these two components.
Chart 9 provides an illustration of the first channel at the macroeconomic level: inadequate 
investment planning in the face of changes in the pace of economic activity. Both figures provide 
some support for the sluggishness hypothesis, that firms need time to adjust their investment 
plans to changes in the demand environment. Chart 9.1shows that when growth is higher than 
expected, firms are more likely to report an investment gap. Chart 9.2 also provides evidence 
of this relationship with actual GDP growth: when growth accelerates (slows down), firms tend 
to report a higher (lower) investment gap. With an R-squared of 5%, the intensity of the relationship 
is weaker than with the unanticipated change in economic activity (for which the R-squared 
reaches 9%). This lower intensity suggests that firms are not myopic; they forecast activity and 
adjust their investment plan accordingly. Overall, the intensity of the relationship between an 
unanticipated change in activity and the investment gap remains weak, explaining up to 9% of 
the cross-country dispersion. This leaves room for the second channel, exogenous to the firm 
and linked to its economic, financial and regulatory environment. Nonetheless, it is likely that the 
relationship intensifies when taking into account forecasts of market activity closer to the firms’ 
actual market, such as sectorial forecast. Unfortunately, such forecasts are not publicly available.
5.2 Investment gaps and factors limiting investment: an EU-wide analysis
The question on impediments reported in the EIBIS provides an opportunity to assess the 
relevance of this mechanism: the extent to which investment gaps arise from the incapacity 
of corporations to reach their optimal investment level.16 In what follows, we estimate a probit 
16  Considering perceived investment gaps instead of actual investment growth enables us to leave aside the issue 
of determining the optimal investment level. Impediments can also affect the optimal investment level, but this is 
unobserved.
SOURCES: EIBIS-16, EIBIS-17, Eurostat and European Commission.
a Investment gap averaged across EIBIS-16 and EIBIS-17.
b For each economy, the forecasting error is computed as the difference between actual GDP growth in 2015 and the GDP forecast in the European Economic 
Forecast Autumn 2014 of the European Commission.
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model for the investment gap using information obtained from the question on impediments. The 
relationship between the investment gap and the impediment is tested successively for each 
type of impediment using the same equation.
As before, the dependent variable takes the value one if the fi rm reports having invested 
too little, and zero otherwise (the fi rms having refused to answer are omitted). The model is similar 
to that used in the previous section to explain the investment impediments, namely a static probit 
model in which the two years of the survey are stacked:
gapi = probit (α + β1profi + β2 indebti + β3liquidi + β4sizei + sector and age dummies + δmin dum
min 
+ δmaj dum
maj ) + εi                                                                                                          (3)
where prof is the profi tability ratio, indebt is the indebtedness ratio, liquid is the liquidity 
ratio, and size is the size expressed as the logarithm of total assets. Part of the regression structure 
incorporates the fi rm’s characteristics, balance sheet, P&L as well as qualitative information, 
such as age and sector. The latter is especially relevant given the asymmetric situation of the 
construction sector in the Periphery economies, as well as more generally the different degree of 
cyclicality across sectors. This part is common to all the equations. Besides, another part of the 
structure accounts for the reported impediments. These enter as a dummy and are considered 
separately depending on their intensity: separate dummies are created for major impediment 
and minor impediment, respectively dummaj and dummin in the equation. Hence, we interpret the 
differences in the results with respect to the omitted category: not reporting an obstacle. Two 
cases are also considered, the case where only the fi rm’s specifi c characteristics are used, and 
the case where all the impediments are considered jointly in the same equation.
The results are reported in Table 4. The coeffi cients in the table indicate the average 
marginal sensitivity, the change in the probability resulting from a one-unit change in the 
explanatory variable, when the others stand at their sample-mean.
In all the estimations, fi rms’ specifi c hard data have the expected sign. First, an increase 
in profi tability is associated with a lower investment gap, a relationship which illustrates the 
relevance of the internal fi nance channel and it is signifi cant at the 99% in any specifi cation 
of the equation. Indeed, a large part of investment is fi nanced internally without recourse to 
external fi nance (Chart 10). When corporations have more internal fi nancing capabilities, they 
are in a better position to fi nance investment and therefore tend to have a lower investment 
gap. In the corporate fi nance literature, this is called the pecking order. Second, more cash 
holdings are associated with lower gaps, though the effect is not signifi cant. Third, more 
leveraged companies tend to show higher gaps. A 10 pp increase in the indebtedness ratio 
is associated with an increase in the probability of reporting an investment gap by between 2.8 pp 
and 5.1 pp. This can be associated with the debt overhang impact on investment: more 
leveraged fi rms tend to invest less, especially in times of fi nancial crisis or following a boom 
cycle (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2018). Interestingly, larger fi rms tend to report lower investment 
gaps. After conditioning on the balance sheet variables, for the same profi tability and balance 
sheet ratios, a fi rm which is twice as large has a lower probability of reporting an investment 
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gap, by between 0.5 pp and 0.9 pp, a small but significant effect.17 It is worth noting that the 
average marginal effect calculated for the variables common to all the regressions remain robust 
to the inclusion of the impediment: they remain of the same sign across all the regressions and 
quite similar magnitude.
Turning to the second part of Table 4, that relating to the impediments, it appears 
that, in all the cases, even after taking into account their characteristics, the firms that report 
an impediment to investment have a higher probability of recording an investment gap. Each of 
the five impediments considered is significant and correctly signed in the regression. Moreover, 
an impediment reported as minor increases the probability of reporting a gap, but by less than 
one reported as major, from twice higher in the case of business or labor regulation, to four 
times higher in the case of finance. Across impediments, the effect varies widely, from 1.7 to 
4.1 pp for minor impediments and from 4 to 16.2 pp in the case of major ones. In both cases, 
reporting finance as an impediment has the highest impact on the gap. When it is major, 
17  In the estimation, size is accounted for a continuous variable, the logarithm of total assets. In other results shown 
before, two groups are considered: SMEs, defined as having between 5 and 250 employees, and large corporations, 
having more than 250 employees.
Without impediments All impediments together 
-22.0*** -24.4*** -25.3*** -24.9*** -24.9*** -22.3*** -22.0***
3.0** 5.0*** 4.9*** 5.1*** 5.1*** 2.8** 3.0**
-1.6 -4.8 4.8 -4.6 -4.9 -1.4 -1.6
-0.5** -0.7*** -0.8*** -0.8*** -0.9*** -0.6** -0.5**
-2.7** -2.2* -2.4* -2.4* -2.3* -2.8** -2.7**
-2.4 -2.0 -2.0 -1.9 -1.7 -2.3 -2.4
-3.4** -3.4** -3.6*** -3.5** -3.4** -3.3** -3.4**
-5.1*** -5.1*** -5.3*** -5.2*** -5.1*** -5.2*** -5.1***
Minor  1.9*     0.7
Major  6.8***     3.2*
Minor   2.2**    -0.4
Major   4.2***    -0.5
Minor    2.4***   1.0
Major    5.0***   2.2**
Minor     1.7*  -0.9
Major     4.0***  -0.5
Minor      4.1*** 3.6***
Major      16.2*** 15.1***
402,8912,8712,8022,8122,8022,8402,8snoitavresbO
Pseudo-R squared 0.043 0.049 0.046 0.046 0.045 0.068 0.070
Labor regulation
Demand
Finance
Impediments one by one
Business regulation
Profitability ratio t-1
Indebtedness ratio t-1
Liquidity ratio t-1
Size (log of assets)
Young firm (<10 years)
Construction sector
Services sector
Infrastructure sector
Uncertainty
TABLE 4PROBIT REGRESSION MODEL OF THE PROBABILITY OF REPORTING AN INVESTMENT GAP (a) (b) (c) (d)
Average marginal effect in percentage points (pp)
SOURCES: EIBIS-16, EIBIS-17 and ORBIS.
a The coefficients are obtained from a probit regression model with country and year fixed effects.
b The standard errors are corrected and clustered at country level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at confidence levels of 90%, 95% and 99%, respectively.
c The constant is omitted in these regressions.
d We separate the effect of minor and major obstacles by including two different dummies. The omitted category is “no obstacle” and thus, results must be interpreted 
according to this baseline. For example, reporting finance as a major obstacle increases the probability of reporting an investment gap by more than 16 pp.
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it increases the probability by 16.2 pp. The relationship remains significant and of a very similar 
magnitude even after considering all the impediments jointly.
Hence, even after controlling for their balance sheet and firms’ characteristics, 
corporations reporting obstacles are more likely to report an investment gap. The most prominent 
impact is obtained when a corporation reports finance as an obstacle. It reaches 16.2 pp when 
it is claimed to be a major obstacle. Reporting uncertainty, business regulation, labor regulation 
and demand as major impediments increases the probability of recording a gap by 6.8, 4.2, 
5 and 4 pp, respectively.
5.3 Heterogeneous effects
We now turn to the estimation of the marginal increase in the probability of having an investment 
gap related to the obstacle faced on different samples. We allow for a differential impact of each 
obstacle depending, respectively, on the region the corporation belong to, the size of the firm, 
its profitability and its indebtedness. In this estimation, we do not consider separately obstacles 
being reported as minor or major (they are given equal weight):
gapi = probit (α + β1 profi + β2indebti + β3liquidi + β4sizei + sector and age dummies + δgroup 
dumgroup + δobs dum
obs + δinter dum
group dumobs ) + εi                                                                       (4)
where:
dumgroup = 1 if firm belongs to the group considered, 0 otherwise
dumobs = 1 if firm reports a minor or major obstacle, 0 otherwise
The group dummy (dumgroup) reflects if the firm belongs to the group considered or not, 
for instance, whether they are highly indebted or not. The obstacle dummy (dumobs) is defined 
as before: it takes value one if the firm reports a minor or major obstacle, and zero otherwise. 
Finally, the inclusion of the interaction term means that we are allowing for differential effects of 
the different obstacles on the score function depending on the group considered.
SOURCES: EIBIS-16 and EIBIS-17.
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The groupings and related estimations are conducted for the regions, size,profitability 
and indebtedness. The results are reported in Chart 11 and Chart 12. In each figure, for each 
impediment, the bar indicates the average marginal effect of reporting an obstacle for each 
of the groups considered. The vertical range indicates the confidence interval at 95%.
For example, consider the column “Uncertainty” in Chart 11.2. The blue bar depicts 
the average marginal effect of reporting the uncertainty obstacle on the investment gap for 
SMEs. The light red bar represents the effect for the case of large corporations. The vertical line 
reports the confidence interval at 95%. If a confidence interval includes the zero then we can 
conclude that the effect for the group considered is not significant at the 95% level.
SOURCES: EIBIS-16 and EIBIS-17.
a Estimations based on equation (4).
b Consistent with the literature, SMEs are defined as companies having from to 5 to 250 employees. Large corporations are the ones with more than 250 employees.
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Looking across regions, when reporting uncertainty or finance as an obstacle, firms in the 
Periphery group are more likely to record an investment gap than firms in the Cohesion or Other 
economies groups. However, the differences across regions in the average marginal effect remain 
very small and not statistically significant. This indicates that the geographic dimension is not, 
over the period considered, the most discriminatory for the relationship between uncertainty 
and the investment gap. Reporting uncertainty as an impediment has an effect on recording 
an investment gap which is relatively symmetric across regions. This is true for all the 
impediments: when reported, they are associated with a higher investment gap. The intensity 
of the relationship varies very little across regions.
Conversely, the probability of reporting an investment gap increases significantly and 
irrespective of the nature of the impediment, for small compared to large corporations (Chart 11.2), 
the least profitable ones (Chart 12.1) and for the most indebted enterprises (Chart 12.2). The 
average effects are aligned with those found when using the variable in the regression, but they 
differ widely across groups. They are more pronounced when the explanatory variable reaches 
the higher part of the distribution. On average, firms reporting an obstacle to investment are likely 
to report an investment gap. The smaller, less profitable or more indebted they are, the stronger 
the intensity of the signal received.
Looking across the impediments, reporting finance as an obstacle has the strongest 
signal, well above the other four types of obstacles considered. It is significant in all the cases for 
the two groups considered in isolation and stronger for the “weakest” firms.
Interestingly, focusing on size only, when smaller enterprises report an impediment 
they are also more likely to have an investment gap; but for larger ones, this is not the case. 
Large firms reporting an impediment do not have a significantly higher probability of having an 
investment gap. This is true for each impediment, except finance (Chart 12.1). This may suggest 
that large enterprises are able to cope with the impediments reported, while conversely, SMEs 
are in a weaker position and more likely to suffer from the gap they report.
Taken together, these results indicate that, beyond the balance sheet and P&L 
characteristics of the company, the size of an enterprise is the most discriminatory dimension 
affecting the relationship between the perceived obstacle and the investment gap. The smaller 
the corporation, the larger the effect of an obstacle on investment.
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6 Do reported investment barriers explain investment gaps?
In this paper, we have exploited a database matching the EIBIS with hard data from balance 
sheet and P&L information. The EIBIS provides a way to illustrate the major investment channels, 
as firms report impediments to investment resulting from demand, uncertainty, finance and both 
business and labor regulation. Our analysis has exploited information about firms’ characteristics 
and impediments to investment to analyze the investment gap. Linking firms’ investment gap 
with firms’ impediments to investment, while controlling for firms’ characteristics, we have 
provided novel evidence on the relative importance different obstacles may have in explaining 
the investment gap that firms report experiencing in their recent activity.
The main findings of the paper are threefold. First, we show that survey-based 
measures provide a reliable source of the channels mentioned as they correlate rather well with 
macro-based hard data compiled at the country level. Hence, signals for non-financial corporate 
investment received from the survey can be extracted. Second, we show that “weaker” firms 
defined as firms that are smaller, and/or more indebted, and/or less profitable and/or with lower 
liquidity positions, tend to report more impediments. Whether this reflects the endogeneity of 
the firm to its environment or some bias in the perceptions is left to further research. Third, we 
show that, controlling for the firms’ characteristics, reporting an impediment provides a signal 
for investment. Firms reporting impediments are more likely to report an investment gap, with 
a stronger magnitude when the impediment is reported as major. The signal intensifies when it 
is given by “weaker” firms. As we do not find such dependency on the region, our results do 
not support the notion that corporations located in the periphery continue to be discriminated 
against for systemic reasons years after the end of the financial crisis.
From a policy standpoint, our findings suggest that survey-based information can be a 
useful input to complement both macro and micro hard data, and to better inform the design of 
targeted policies to support investment.
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Annex I. The European Investment Bank Investment Survey (EIBIS)
The EIB Group Survey on Investment and Investment Finance (EIBIS) is an annual survey of 
around 12,500 European non-financial corporations conducted since 2016. Corporations 
of each European country are asked to answer around 55 questions with the aim of better 
understanding the drivers and constraints of investment decisions. The sample is drawn to 
provide a good representation of the non-financial corporate sector of the European economy 
in terms of country, sector, size and age.18 It is designed to build a panel of enterprise data so 
as to follow firms over time. Overall, in each EU country, between 300 and 600 corporations are 
surveyed each year, among which around 60% are new and 40% belong to the panel group. 
The analysis developed in this paper is based on the results from the first two waves of this 
survey (2016 and 2017), as the third wave had not yet been released at the time of the work 
conducted in the paper.
The EIBIS recoups four main blocks of both qualitative and quantitative questions:
1. The survey collects data on firm characteristics and investment performance, 
specifying, among other things, the firms’ sector group (manufacturing, services, 
construction and infrastructure) and size classes (micro, small, medium and large).
2. The survey offers detailed information about past investment activities and future 
plans. On the one hand, firms are asked about their past decision to invest and the 
intensity of investment. Several questions relate to the composition of investment 
in use/nature/purpose. It is worth noting that these questions allow for a good 
characterization of investment in intangible assets, well beyond the limited definition 
that can be typically derived from balance sheet firm-level data. On the other hand, 
firms are asked about their investment plans and needs. In particular, firms report 
the presence or absence of a perceived investment gap, defined as a relationship 
between the investment level and the investment that ensures the success of their 
business going forward.19 This information set provides novel evidence about the 
existence of suboptimal investment decisions and can potentially indicate the need 
for policy actions.
3. The survey contains a block related to the perception of potential obstacles to 
investment. This block is widely exploited in the main text.
4. The survey provides relevant information about investment finance, covering 
aspects such as the source of finance (external, internal and intra-group), the type 
18  The questionnaire is available at http://www.eib.org/attachments/eibis_general_module_questionnaire_2016_en.pdf. 
Minor changes were made to it in the 2017 wave, but the structure remains the same. The methodology of the EIBIS 
survey is available at http://www.eib.org/attachments/eibis_methodology_report_2017_en.pdf.
19  This information is based on question 24 of the EIBIS survey. Firms are asked: “Looking back at your investment over 
the last three years, was it too much, too little, or about the right amount to ensure the success of your business going 
forward?”
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 36 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1908
of external finance used for investment activities and a range of questions that 
allows for characterization as to whether firms are finance-constrained.
Overall, our data compile novel qualitative information and provide a unique and 
suitable framework to gain a better understanding of the drivers and constraints of investment 
decisions in European countries. Furthermore, their granularity allows for the inspection of 
potential heterogeneous effects of such drivers and constraints among corporations with 
different characteristics.
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Annex II. Matching EIBIS and ORBIS
In the analysis, data from the EIBIS survey are matched with balance sheet and profit 
and loss data collected by ORBIS. For each firm, specific qualitative and quantitative information 
is associated. This enables the perceptions on the barriers to investment to be analyzed in 
conjunction with hard data on investment, controlling for traditional investment determinants 
such as the financial and profitability position of a firm.
Table A2 presents some basic summary statistics related to the explanatory variables 
used in the regressions used in the main text, namely the debt-to-assets ratio, the return 
on assets and the cash ratio. The statistics are reported both at the EU level and for the 
three regions considered: Periphery, Cohesion and Other economies. Chart A2 depicts 
the distribution of these variable across the three economic regions considered. Table A2 also 
reports the proportion of SMEs, young firms and finance-constrained firms as derived from the 
information of the EIBIS. 
Several stylized facts are worth noting. First, firms in the Cohesion countries seem 
to exhibit a relatively lower leverage level whereas firms in the Periphery countries present a 
lower return on assets level. Second, we do not find significant differences in the cash ratio 
distribution across regions. Also, the Periphery countries seem to be characterized by a higher 
proportion of SMEs and firms which are finance-constrained, while the Cohesion countries 
concentrate a higher proportion of young firms.
SOURCES: EIBIS-16, EIBIS-17 and ORBIS.
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